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The purpose of this research to detect fraudulent financial reporting 
in the property, real estate, and building construction sectors listed 
on the IDX based on the perspective of the fraud pentagon theory. 
The data collection technique used purposive sampling and data 
analysis using logistic regression. The results indicate that that 
external pressure factors, ineffective monitoring, quality of external 
auditors, auditor turnover, rationalization proxied by auditor 
opinion, change of directors, and political connections affected FFR. 
Meanwhile, financial target factors, financial stability, institutional 
ownership, and the frequency of the appearance of the CEO image 
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ABSTRAK 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mendeteksi kecurangan pelaporan 
keuangan pada sektor properti, real estate, dan konstruksi bangunan yang 
terdaftar di BEI berdasar perspektif teori fraud pentagon. Pengumpulan 
data menggunakan teknik purposive sampling dan analisis data 
menggunakan regresi logistik. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa faktor 
tekanan eksternal, pengawasan yang tidak efektif, kualitas auditor 
eksternal, pergantian auditor, rasionalisasi yang diproksikan dengan opini 
auditor, pergantian direksi, dan hubungan politik berpengaruh terhadap 
FFR. Sedangkan faktor target keuangan, stabilitas keuangan, kepemilikan 
institusional, dan frekuensi kemunculan gambar CEO dalam laporan 
tahunan tidak berpengaruh terhadap FFR. 
  
Kata Kunci : Teori Pentagon; Kecurangan Pelaporan Keuangan; 
Tata Kelola Perusahaan; Keberlanjutan 
JEL Classification: M42; G34 
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The act of intentionally presenting invalid information in financial statements to 
avoid negative opinions is called Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR). FFR occurs 
when there is a conscious attempt to provide invalid information to other parties 
regarding the financial statements of an entity, thereby causing significant risks to 
creditors and shareholders and a capital market financial crisis (Huang, Tsaih, & Yu, 
2014). Fraudulent financial behavior can be said as a form of deliberate effort by 
management to deceive and even mislead users and readers of the financial report 
(Arens, Elder, & Beasley, 2008; Priantara, 2013; Sihombing & Rahardjo, 2014). 
Many frauds currently occur in Indonesia, one of which occurs in the property, 
real estate, and building construction sectors. Fraud incidents occurred in the building 
construction sub-sector, namely PT Adhi Karya, Teuku Bagus Mokhamad Noor 
(former Division Head), and Andi Mallarangeng (Former Menpora) and Deddy, who 
used their authority to make decisions for their enrichment and loss. country. The KPK 
named Hambalang as a suspect on March 1, 2013, namely Teuku Bagus. In this case, 
the auction winner pays bribes to officials and the legislature to win the auction case. 
Regarding Deddy Kusdinar, the entity gave around 14 billion rupiahs from PT Wika 
around 6.9 billion rupiahs (Maharani, 2014). Sudaryatmo, Chairman of YLKI, said that 
there was an increase in complaints of violations of law in the property sector that 
users complained to the foundation. In 2014, it was ranked second after the financial 
sector as well as banking. In that year, there was a corruption case committed by the 
director of PT Sentul City Tbk. Kwee Cahyadi Kumala. His arrest was the perpetrator 
of the expansion of a nature reserve in Bogor Regency. In the foundation's records, 
there were about 68 users who complained to the foundation. The rise of fraud in the 
property sector is around 12.7 percent, which is 121 incidents starting in 2013 (Annisya 
et al., 2016). These cases show agency conflicts between agents and principals, which 
encourage fraudulent actions (Javaid & Javid, 2017; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Therefore, serious handling of fraud cases that are rife in the property sector is needed. 
Agency theory is very appropriate to explain this research (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), where a conflict of interest triggers fraud. In addition, several theories that can 
also be used to detect financial fraud behavior are the fraud triangle, diamond, and 
pentagon. The initial theory of the fraud triangle is the detection of FFR caused by 
pressure, opportunity, and rationalization (Cressey, 1953). Furthermore, the theory 
develops into the fraud diamond theory introduced by Wolfe & Hermanson (2004) by 
adding one element that significantly affects fraud, namely capability. The latest 
development related to fraud theory is the emergence of the fraud pentagon 
introduced by Crowe-Horwath (2011), which is an extension of the two previous 
theories, namely the triangle and diamond with the addition of a new element, namely 
arrogance, which has never been used before in detecting financial reporting fraud. 
Applying the five elements in the pentagon theory, namely, opportunity, pressure, 
competence, rationalization, and arrogance, will demonstrate a more comprehensive 
detection of FFR. The five elements of this theory are Crowe's Deception Pentagon 
Theory (Crowe-Horwath, 2011). 
Previous studies on financial reporting fraud have tended to focus on the nature 
of financial reporting fraud (La Porta et al., 1999; Beasley, Hermanson, Carcello, & 
Neal, 2010), corporate governance mechanisms (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & 
Lapides, 2000), and predictions of financial reporting fraud planned, unethical 
behavior (Carpenter & Reimers, 2005), fraud detection through financial reports 
(Dalnial, Kamaluddin, Sanusi, & Khairuddin, 2014), fraud detection in financial 
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reporting fraud related to topology pattern and feature extraction of financial 
statement fraud (Huang et al., 2014), fraud detection in banking and manufacturing 
companies with Faradiza (2019). Previous studies detailing the factors that influence 
financial reporting fraud have yielded inconsistent results. Studies Akbar (2017) 
indicates that FFR is caused by pressure. Tessa & Harto (2016) and Bawekes et al. 
(2018) shows that pressure and arrogance are important elements in detecting FFR. 
Studies Aprilia (2017) also shows that the pressure element which is proxied by 
financial stability affects fraudulent financial reporting, while the other elements do 
not affect FFR. On the other hand, research Ulfah et al. (2017) indicates that fraudulent 
financial reporting is significantly affected by the auditor's opinion and the change of 
auditor which is included in the rationalization element. Novitasari & Chariri (2018) 
stated that the elements in Crowe's fraud pentagon theory, namely rationalization, and 
arrogance, can increase the likelihood of FFR. However, research by Faradiza (2019) 
shows that rationalization and arrogance do not affect FFR. The results of this research 
are supported by Nindito, (2018), which states that the FFR has no influenced by the 
arrogance factor. 
This research is different from previous fraudulent financial reporting research, 
where this research uses the five elements of Crowe's Theory of  Deception and 
broadens the detection area on elements of political connections. We feel the need to 
link fraudulent financial reporting with political connections for several reasons. First, 
it is no longer a secret that Indonesian politics plays an important role in the business 
world. Many politicians are involved in the business world, and vice versa; Many 
businessmen are involved in politics. Entrepreneurs enter politics because of concerns 
over excessive government regulation, tax burdens, and inadequate property 
protection (Li, Meng, & Zhang, 2006). From a politician's point of view, government 
officials need the support of entrepreneurs to achieve economic and political goals, 
including campaign finance needs (Miettinen & Poutvaara, 2014). Companies with 
political connections tend to underperform and break the law (Guoping & Hong, 2015), 
engage in tunneling behavior and earnings management (Habib et al., 2017). Therefore, 
this research aims to detect financial reporting fraud using Crowe's Pentagon theory 
and broaden the detection area to aspects of political connections. 
This research uses a sample of property, real estate, and building construction 
companies during the 2015-2017 period because, during that period, the number of 
fraud cases in companies' samples tends to increase. The results of this research 
indicate that FFR is influenced by external pressure, ineffective monitoring, quality of 
external auditors, auditor turnover, rationalization proxied by auditor opinion, change 
of directors, and political connections. These results indicate that in the Indonesian 
context, particularly in companies' samples, these variables have the potential to 
trigger FFR. While financial stability, financial targets, frequency of appearance of CEO 
images, and institutional ownership do not affect FFR. 
The results are expected to benefits theoretically the development of literature 
related to agency conflict between principals, agents, and all stakeholders. In addition, 
the results are also expected to have a role in corporate governance policies to 
minimize fraud financial reporting. 
 
METHOD 
 The sample period was conducted in 2015-2017 because the development of the 
property, real estate, and building construction sectors in Indonesia tends to increase. 
The data analysis technique used logistic regression and the analytical tool used 
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Minitab Version 18. Sample selection using purposive sampling, while the number of 
samples that meet the criteria are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Criteria for Sample Companies 
No. Information Amount 
1 Property entities, luxury housing, and construction buildings 
on the IDX for the 2015-2017 period. 
58 
2 The entity does not publish audited financials and annual 
information on the IDX portal during 2015-2017, which is 
translated into Indonesian rupiah (IDR/ Rp). 
(12) 
3 Companies deleted between 2015-2017 0 
4 Information on data related to research variables is not 
entirely available (data as a whole are not available in 
publications during the 2015-2017 period). 
(2) 
 Total Sample Overall  44 
 
The number of samples is 44 companies. Before the regression, some missing 
observational data and years of observation of companies with different financial years 
were deleted, so the final number of observational data in this research was 115. There 
are 12 research variables, namely Financial Target (FT), Financial Stability (FS), 
External Pressure (EP), Institutional Ownership (IO), Ineffectiveness Monitoring (IM), 
External Auditor Quality (EAQ), Auditor Change (AC), Auditor's Opinion (AO), 
Change of Directors (CD), CEO Image Frequency, Political Connection (PC), and 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR). Details of the measurement of each variable are 
shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Variables and Measurements 
No. Variable Measurement 
1 FT ROA  
2 FS ACHANGES  
3 EP Leverage  
4 IO OSHIP 
5 IM BDOUT  
6 EAQ Code 1 if using KAP BIG 4 and and code 0 otherwise 
7 AC Code 1 if a change in KAP and code 0 otherwise 
8 AO Code 1 for companies that receive an unqualified opinion in 
explanatory language, and code 0 otherwise 
9 CD Code 1 if a change of directors and code 0 otherwise 
10 CEO Image 
Frequency 
CEO Image Appearance Frequency 
11 PC Code 1 if there are directors or board of commissioners who 
have political relations and code 0 otherwise 
12 FFR Code 1 for companies that do restatement of financial 
statements and code 0 otherwise 
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RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
This research aims to provide empirical evidence about the factors that influence 
FFR using Crowe's Pentagon theory. Logistic regression analysis with Minitab version 
18 was used to test the effect between variables. Before performing logistic regression 
analysis, descriptive statistical analysis was performed. The feasibility test of the 
regression model consists of a test NS overall fit model, Hosmer's test, Lemeshow's 
test, Nagelkerke's r square test, and the classification matrix test. The results of 
descriptive statistical tests are presented in the Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Means St. Dev min Max 
FT 0.048 0.064 -0.249 0.359 
FS 140.1 843.4 -99.40 8882.6 
EP 0.425 0.195 -0.015 0.793 
IO 65.94 23.39 11.58 99.99 
IM 0.384 0.103 0.170 0830 
EAQ 0.316 0.467 0.000 1,000 
AC 0.206 0.406 0.000 1,000 
AO 0897 0.304 0.000 1,000 
CD 0.111 0.315 0.000 1,000 
CEO Image Frequency 4.957 1,729 1,000 11.00 
PC 0.273 0.447 0.000 1,000 
FFR 0.760 0.428 0.000 1,000 
 
Table 3 shows that the total observation data obtained in this research were 115 
companies during 2015 - 2017. The financial target showed the lowest value of -0.249 
disclosed by the DGIK company in 2016. Disclosure of unfriendly financial targets 
indicates that the company in that period suffered losses. However, in the 2017 period, 
the DGIK company improved its performance by maximizing its assets to generate 
profits. The FMII company revealed the highest value of 0.359 in 2016. FMII, which is 
engaged in real estate and construction services, experienced an increase in its sales 
target in 2016 by 68.33 percent of the set target. FMII's source of income comes from the 
sale of land, warehousing and housing. Revenue growth in 2016 was obtained from the 
sale of land which experienced a significant increase of around 90 percent from 2015. 
The mean value is 0.048 which is lower than the standard deviation of 0.064, indicating 
that the data varies. The mean value is 0.048 which is lower than the standard 
deviation of 0.064, indicating that the data varies.  
Financial stability showed the lowest value of -99.40 which was disclosed by the 
SMRA company in 2017. SMRA's financial stability in 2017 was negative due to a very 
significant decline in asset value compared to the previous period. The decrease in 
assets was due to an increase in financial expenses. The highest value of 8882.6 was 
disclosed by the MYRX company in 2015. During the observation period, the asset 
value of the MYRX company continued to increase. The mean value of 140.1 is lower 
than the standard deviation of 843.4, indicating variable data. 
External pressure showed the lowest value of -0.015 disclosed by the OMRE 
company in 2015, meaning that the company has not been able to manage assets to 
meet its obligations. However, in 2016 and 2017, the company optimized the use of its 
assets so that it was able to meet its obligations. The highest value of 0.793 was 
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disclosed by the ADHI company in 2015. The company has a good performance in 
asset management so that during the observation period, the company demonstrated 
its ability to fulfill its obligations. The mean value of 0.425 which is higher than the 
standard deviation of 0.195 indicates that the data is less varied. Overall, the companies 
that were used as research samples carried out operational activities using borrowed 
funds. 
Institutional shareholdings show the lowest value of 11.58 disclosed by MYRX 
companies during 2015–2017. During the observation period, the company did not 
have a share ownership program for employees. The MTLA company revealed the 
highest score of 99.99 during 2015-2016. The subsidiary has a 99.99 percent 
shareholding. The mean value of 65.94 which is higher than the standard deviation of 
23.39 indicates that the data is less varied. Overall, the observed companies own 65.94 
percent of institutional shares. 
The ineffectiveness of supervision shows the lowest value of 0.170 disclosed by 
BCIP companies during 2016-2017 and the highest value of 0.830 disclosed by LPKR 
companies in 2016. The average value is 0.384 higher than the standard deviation of 
0.103, indicating that the data is less varied. Whole, Companies that are used as 
research samples have independent commissioners of at least 30 percent of the total 
company's board of commissioners.  
Auditor quality indicates the lowest value of 0.000 and the highest value of 1000 
by measuring using a dummy. The average value of 0.316 means that 31.6 percent of 
companies use the services of KAP Big 4 in auditing financial statements. The mean 
value is 0.316 lower than the standard deviation of 0.467, indicating that the data 
varies. 
The change in auditors indicates the lowest value of 0.000 and the highest value 
of 1000 by measuring using a dummy. The average value of 0.206 means that 20.6 
percent of companies change auditors during the 2015-2017 period. The mean value is 
0.206 lower than the standard deviation of 0.406, indicating that the data varies. 
The auditor's opinion indicates the lowest value of 0.000 and the highest value of 
1000 by measuring using a dummy. The average value of 0.897 means that 89.7 percent 
of companies have an unqualified opinion on the financial statements that have been 
audited by the auditors. The mean value is 0.897 which is higher than the standard 
deviation of 0.304, indicating a small variation in the data. 
Changes in directors showed the lowest score of 0.000 and the highest score of 
1000 by measuring using a dummy. The average value of 0.111 means that 11.1 percent 
of companies change directors during the 2015-2017 period. The mean value of 0.111 is 
lower than the standard deviation of 0.315, indicating that the data varies. 
The frequency of the appearance of the CEO image shows the lowest value of 
1,000 disclosed by the company KIJA, which only shows the image of the CEO in 2017, 
whereas in 2015 and 2016, the image of the CEO did not appear. The highest value of 
11,000 was disclosed by the JKON company in 2017. The average value of 4,957 is 
higher than the standard deviation of 1,729, indicating fewer variable data. 
Political relations show the lowest value of 0.000 and the highest value of 1000 
using a dummy measurement. The average value of 0.273 means 27.3 percent of 
companies the board of directors or the board of commissioners have political relations 
within the company during the 2015-2017 period. The mean value of 0.273 is lower 
than the deviation of 0.447, indicating that the data varies. 
Fraudulent financial reporting shows a low of 0.000 and a high of 1,000 with 
dummy measurements. The average value of 0.760 means that 76 percent of companies 
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restate their financial statements during the 2015-2017 period. The mean value of 0.760 
is greater than the deviation of 0.428, indicating that the data is less varied. 
This research predicts that FFR is influenced by pressure factors, opportunity 
factors, rationalization factors, competence factors, and arrogance factors. Thus the 
model developed in this research is: 
 
           ……………………………….(Equation 1) 
 
Based on this model, an estimation test was carried out as shown in table 4. 
 
Table 4. Independent Sample T-Test 
Source DF Chi-Square P-value 
Regression 11 52,23 0,000 
FT 1 1,47 0,225 
FS 1 0,09 0,771 
EP 1 7,34 0,007 
IO 1 0,61 0,433 
IM 1 6,92 0,009 
EAQ 1 6,46 0,011 
AC 1 7,26 0,007 
AO 1 21,11 0,000 
CD 1 6,80 0,009 
CEO Image Frequency 1 0,14 0,709 
PC 1 7,48 0,006 
Error 104   
Total 115   
 
Financial Target and Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
The results of logistic regression testing prove that FT has no significant effect on 
FFR, as evidenced by p-value = 0.225 > 0.05. This shows that pressure in the form of 
financial targets set by companies sample does not have an impact on FFR. The 
property, real estate, and building construction sectors always experience growth 
every year because people still tend to invest in these sectors. Therefore, the company 
has no difficulty in achieving the ROA target. It is proven by the FMII company that 
was able to achieve financial performance in 2016 with an achievement of Rp.402 
billion or an increase of 68.33 percent from the same period in 2015 of Rp.238.86 billion. 
Assessment of financial targets through ROA can show the company's 
performance in optimizing its assets to gain profits. Companies that have a high ROA 
value in a period have no pressure so they can report financial performance without 
manipulation. This condition is supported by the creation of good corporate 
governance and superior human resources. HR management and development can 
support the creation of a conducive work environment to increase professionalism so 
that all components are motivated to increase company value compared to 
manipulating company financial reports. 
The results of this research are in line with Rusmana & Tanjung (2020); 
Novitasari & Chariri (2018);Bawakes et al. (2018); Septriyani & Handayani (2018); Tessa 
& Harto (2016); and Ulfah et al. (2017). Financial targets as measured by ROA do not 
necessarily indicate FFR. The company seeks to increase the value of ROA by 
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maximizing financial and non-financial assets such as the ability of employees and 
loyal customers. However, this result is not in line with Faradiza (2019); Santoso (2019); 
Septriyani & Handayani (2018) and Widarti, (2015) which indicates that FT do affect 
FFR. 
 
Financial Stability and Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
The results of logistic regression testing prove that FS has no significant effect on 
FFR, as evidenced by p-value = 0.771 > 0.05. This shows that if the company's financial 
stability is stable, it will not affect the company in manipulating financial statements. 
The sample company shows that the company's financial condition is stable. Financial 
stability is seen from changes in the growth of company assets every year. It is proven 
in the MYRX company which during the observation period, the value of the 
company's assets continues to increase. The financial stability achieved is also 
influenced by good corporate governance. The existence of strict supervision from the 
board of commissioners in controlling management actions will minimize the 
occurrence of FFR. The act of manipulating stable financial conditions is an action that 
will trigger distrust of shareholders, which will also lead to a decrease in the value of 
the company. 
The results of this research are in line with research Aprilia, (2017); Bayagub, 
Zulfa, & Firdausi Mustoffa (2018); Ulfah et al., (2017); Novitasari & Chariri (2018); 
Ijudien (2018); and Rusmana & Tanjung (2020). The company will not rashly commit 
fraud just to increase the stability of the company. The development of the property, 
real estate, and building construction sectors means companies don't have to worry 
about losing investors. However, this result is not in line with Bawekes et al. (2018); 
Sihombing & Rahardjo (2014); Septriyani & Handayani (2018); and (Faradiza, 2019) 
which concludes that financial stability affects FFR. 
 
External Pressure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
The results of logistic regression testing prove that EP has a significant effect on 
FFR, as evidenced by p-value = 0.007 < 0.05.  High leverage indicates high external 
pressure so that it has the potential to commit fraudulent financial reporting; as stated 
by Dalnial et al. (2014) that a high debt-to-equity ratio is one indicator of fraudulent 
financial reporting. Companies that have high leverage indicate that the company has 
large debt and high credit risk as well. This makes external parties, namely investors 
and creditors who have provided loans, worry that the company will not be able to 
repay the loans. Therefore, the company must be able to convince external parties that 
the company will be able to repay the debt by manipulating the financial statements. 
Companies manipulate financial reports with the aim that the company's performance 
and company prospects look good so that they can convince investors and creditors 
that the company can make debt payments.  
The results of this research are in line with Widarti, (2015); Tessa & Harto (2016)); 
Bayagub et al. (2018); Rusmana & Tanjung (2020); and Yesiariani & Rahayu (2017) 
which states that the higher the loan an agency, the lender will hesitate in providing a 
loan. The existence of these conditions is likely to encourage the entity to make efforts 
to attract creditors' sympathy by committing fraudulent financial reporting actions to 
achieve the goal of obtaining loan funds. 
The results of this research are not in line with Fimanaya & Syafrudding (2014); 
Novitasari & Chariri (2018); Bawekes et al. (2018); Septriyani & Handayani (2018) and 
Faradiza (2019)who found evidence that the higher the company's debt, the more 
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additional supervision from creditors and company management will reconsider 
committing fraud. Excessive pressure for the company to fulfill the wishes of 
shareholders does not necessarily make management increase debt which will cause a 
high burden and ultimately encourage management to practice financial statements 
fraud (Ijudien, 2018). 
 
Institutional Ownership and Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
The results of logistic regression testing prove that IO has no significant effect on 
FFR, as evidenced by p-value = 0.433 > 0.05. Institutional investors are better able to 
prevent earnings management and are considered more professional in controlling 
investment portfolios. The more significant the proportion of shares owned by the 
institution will lead to more effective supervision because it can control the 
opportunistic behavior of managers and reduce agency costs (Jensen, 1986; Nuraina, 
2012). Thus, the higher the proportion of institutional ownership, the higher the 
professionalism and better corporate governance, so that it will not encourage 
manipulation of financial statements. The results of this research are also in line with 
research Bawekes et al. (2018); Bayagub et al. (2018); Tessa & Harto (2016); Ulfah et al. 
(2017); Hardiningsih (2010); Mahariana & Ramantha (2014); and Riandani & 
Rahmawati (2019).  
In encouraging increased supervision of company operations to be more optimal, 
the role of institutional ownership is very much needed in management supervision. 
This is because institutional investors are involved in strategic decisions so they do not 
easily believe in profit manipulation (Riandani & Rahmawati, 2019). Managers may be 
motivated to manipulate the company's profits to meet short-term goals. The existence 
of institutional ownership results in managers being obliged to meet investors' profit 
targets so that the act of manipulating company profits will still be carried out 
(Mahariana & Ramantha, 2014). 
 
Ineffectiveness Monitoring and Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
The results of logistic regression testing prove that IM has a significant effect on 
FFR, as evidenced by p-value = 0.009 < 0.05. This shows that the existence of 
independent commissioners has an important role in the supervisory function. The 
effectiveness of supervision is proven to reduce the manipulation of financial reports. 
This research is in line with Septriyani & Handayani (2018). Ineffective monitoring is a 
situation where ineffective internal controls lead to fraud. Weak corporate supervision 
provides an opportunity for someone to commit fraud for their personal interests. 
Based on agency theory, the absence of effective control from the principal will allow 
the agent to commit fraudulent actions. An external party is needed, namely an 
independent board of commissioners in supervising the company so that fraudulent 
practices in financial statements can be minimized. The existence of a board of 
commissioners who has no relationship with shareholders, directors, management or 
other internal parties is expected to carry out more independent supervision. 
The results of this research are not in line with Faradiza (2019); Rusmana & 
Tanjung (2020); Novitasari & Chariri (2018); Bawekes et al. (2018); and Yesiariani & 
Rahayu (2017). The existence of an independent board of commissioners is meaningless 
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External Auditor Quality and Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
The results of logistic regression testing prove that EAQ has a significant effect 
on FFR, as evidenced by p-value = 0.011 < 0.05. This research is not following research 
from Ulfah et al. (2017). This shows that the professionalism and independence of 
auditors play an important role in improving the quality of financial reports. BIG 4 
audit entities have human resources that are committed to avoiding financial 
information fraud compared to Non Big 4 audit entities. Audit quality will affect the 
quality of financial reports so that companies audited by Big 4 auditors tend to report 
following applicable accounting standards and avoid manipulation of financial 
statements. 
When special auditors audit the financial statements of companies who usually 
have better knowledge of the company's business processes, they can work well 
together and transfer knowledge with the audit committee so that they can further 
improve the quality of financial statements, namely earnings predictability 
(Mutmainnah & Wardhani, 2013). The results of this research are not in line with 
Bawekes et al. (2018); Bayagub et al. (2018); and Hardiningsih (2010) which states that 
audit quality has no significant effect on the integrity of financial statements. 
 
Auditor Change and Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
The results of logistic regression testing prove that AC has a significant effect on 
FFR, as evidenced by p-value = 0.007 < 0.05. These results indicate that the change of 
auditors is possible because of the agency conflict between the agent and the principal. 
Change of auditors can be considered as a form of eliminating traces found by 
previous auditors. The change of auditor will result in a transition period from the old 
auditor to the new auditor, as stated by Sihombing & Rahardjo (2014) that the change 
of a company's public accountant can result in a period of transition and stress for the 
company. Changes in auditors can also be carried out because the auditor resigns 
because of the discovery of material misstatements. 
However, in the context of Indonesia, the change of auditors may not only be due 
to fraud. This condition is also possible because of the necessity to comply with 
Government Regulation Number 20 of 2015 article 11 paragraph 1 which regulates the 
provision of audit services on the financial statements of an entity by public 
accountants for a maximum of five consecutive financial years (Yesiariani & Rahayu, 
2016). Thus, in the Indonesian context, especially in the sample companies used in this 
research, auditor turnover has a significant effect on fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
Auditor's Opinion and Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
The results of logistic regression testing prove that the AO has a significant effect 
on FFR, as evidenced by p-value = 0.000 < 0.05. These results indicate that the auditor's 
opinion represents the quality of the client's financial statements. The better the 
auditor's opinion, the more likely the client has presented the financial reporting 
following generally accepted accounting principles. 
In this research, the auditor's opinion represents the client's rationalization. As 
stated by Shelton, (2014) that rationalization is a person's mindset that justifies his 
thoughts in committing crimes. This client rationalization gets tolerance from the 
auditor. This is confirmed by Sukirman & Sari, (2013) which state that the auditor 
needs to consider and identify risk factors that cause the client to commit fraudulent 
acts. Thus, in the context of Indonesia, particularly companies in the property, real 
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estate, and building construction sectors, have rationalizations in committing financial 
reporting fraud. 
 
Change of Directors and Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
The results of logistic regression testing prove that the CD has a significant effect 
on FFR, as evidenced by p-value = 0.009 < 0.05. These results indicate that the change 
of directors indicates the possibility of financial reporting fraud. The position of the 
board of directors is often a determining factor for fraud. The change of directors was 
carried out due to two possibilities, first, due to efforts to improve the performance of 
the previous directors. The second possibility is that there was an attempt to eliminate 
the previous directors, knowing of fraudulent financial reporting (Siddiq & Suseno, 
2019).  
The board of directors is considered to have the capability. The act of fraud in 
financial reporting is impossible for people who do not have good capability in 
committing fraud. As opinion (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004) states that a person commits 
fraud because he has capabilities in the form of position/function, brains, 
confidence/ego, coercion skills, effective lying, and immunity to stress. Based on this 
statement, the CEO and the board of directors have the appropriate characteristics and 
can take advantage of these positions to encourage those around them to commit 
fraudulent acts. Changes in the board of directors will cause a stress period, thus 
opening up opportunities for fraudulent financial reporting (Brennan & McGrath, 
2007). Thus, the change of directors has an impact on fraudulent financial reporting. 
The results of this research are in line with Bayagub et al. (2018); Faradiza (2019); 
Septriyani & Handayani (2018). 
 
CEO Image Frequency and Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
The results of logistic regression testing prove that the frequency of the 
appearance of the CEO's image has no significant effect on FFR, as evidenced by p-
value = 0.709 > 0.05. Several previous studies have shown that the frequent appearance 
of the CEO's image in the annual report is synonymous with arrogance. CEO arrogance 
can affect management behavior in making financial statements. The pressure exerted 
by the CEO can trigger fraudulent financial reporting (Dumaria & Majidah, 2019). 
However, this research gives different results, where the frequency of the appearance 
of the CEO's image does not affect fraudulent financial reporting. These results indicate 
that the possible frequency of appearance of the CEO image in the annual report is 
only as a form of introducing the CEO figure to stakeholders and the wider community 
as well as a form of CEO self-actualization in various company activities. 
The existence and reputation of the CEO need to be known to the public so that 
the CEO figure in the form of images listed in the annual report will further introduce 
the CEO's self-image. Therefore, in the Indonesian context, especially in the property, 
real estate, and building construction sector companies, the appearance of the CEO 
image in the annual report does not affect fraudulent financial reporting. The results of 
this research are in line with Ulfah et al. (2017); Setiawati & Baningrum (2018); 
Nurchoirunanisa et al. (2020). However, the results of this research are not in line with 
Tessa & Harto, (2016) and Siddiq & Suseno, (2019).  
 
Political Connection and Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
The results of logistic regression testing prove that PC has a significant effect on 
FFR, as evidenced by p-value = 0.006 < 0.05. These results indicate that the stronger the 
political relationship, the higher the level of fraudulent financial reporting. Political 
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relations will benefit both the company and the government. Companies need political 
relations because of the hope of getting projects from the government to control large 
amounts of resources (Lockett, 1988). Likewise, the government needs entrepreneurs 
for funding purposes during campaigns (Miettinen & Poutvaara, 2014). Politics plays 
an important role in the business world. The power of political influence from 
government officials, chairmen, or members of the board or parties through related 
party transactions often has an impact on business decision-making. 
Political connections provide many advantages in the form of obtaining financial 
resources but have the potential to cause an oversupply of credit and increase the 
financial burden (Ling, Zhou, Liang, Song, & Zeng, 2016). The existence of pressure in 
the form of an increase in burden will potentially trigger actions that lead to fraud. 
Therefore, political connections tend to affect financial reporting fraud. The results are 
in line with Matangkin et al. (2018) and Guoping & Hong, (2015), which states that 
companies with political connections tend to underperform and break the law. 
However, the results are not in line with (Hasnan, Daie, & Hussain, 2016) which states 
that political relations do not affect financial reporting fraud. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Based on empirical analysis, it can be concluded external pressure, ineffective 
monitoring, external auditor quality, auditor change, rationalization proxied by 
auditor opinion, change of directors, and political connections affect FFR. These results 
indicate that in the Indonesian context, particularly in property, real estate, and 
building construction sector companies, these variables have the potential to trigger 
FFR. Meanwhile, financial targets, financial stability, institutional ownership, and the 
frequency of the appearance of the CEO image in the annual report do not affect FFR.  
The results of this research have implications for the structure and mechanism of 
corporate governance, where the factors that influence FFR are very important to 
consider. Accounting scandals, objectivity, and reliability of financial reports are 
important for stakeholders, which directly or indirectly have an impact on 
sustainability. 
The sample of this research is limited to property, real estate, and building 
construction sector companies. Therefore, further studies can expand the area of 
observation to all sectors of the company and relate several other factors such as CEO 
duality, military relations, capital structure, and ownership structure. 
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